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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the performance and development of the Mexican 
pension annuity market established as a consequence of the 1997 pension 
reform.  The Mexican experience displays interesting characteristics 
providing lessons for other countries that still need to design the 
decumulation phase of their newly established second pillars.  At the same, 
time it raises some technical and policy concerns that need addressing as 
they could hamper, in the future, the healthy development of the market.  
The paper concludes that: 1) general life insurance companies may better 
hedge longevity risk than specialized annuity companies; 2) competition 
should be based on prices rather than additional products; 3) better 
disclosure of options under the 1973 and 1997 social security laws should 
be given to disability and life annuitants; and 4) various measures should 
be taken to improve asset liability management including allowing 
companies to trade over the counter derivatives and substituting over time 
the regulatory asset liability management framework with an economic 
asset liability management framework. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: G15, G18, G22, G23, G28. 
Keywords: Mexico, Pension, Annuity Markets, Financial Sector Development. 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4236, May 2007 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress 
to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series 
is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. 
The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. 
They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or 



















































































































dThe Mexican Pension Annuity Market 
     
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents.................................................................................................................i 
List of Tables.......................................................................................................................i 
List of Figures.....................................................................................................................ii 
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 
I  The 1992 and 1997 Pension Reforms......................................................................... 1 
II  The Market for Pension Annuities.............................................................................. 4 
II.A  Market Structure and Growth............................................................................. 4 
II.B  Pension Annuity Products, Pricing, and Competition ........................................ 7 
II.C  Evolution of Liabilities..................................................................................... 11 
II.D  Evolution of Assets and Investment ................................................................. 13 
II.E  Market Performance.......................................................................................... 20 
III  Development Prospects For The Pension Annuity Market................................... 28 
Conclusions and Policy Considerations............................................................................ 34 
References......................................................................................................................... 39 
APPENDIX A : Regulatory Framework for Pension Annuities....................................... 41 
APPENDIX B : List of Acronyms.................................................................................... 44 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1: Contributions Under SAR-92 and SAR-97 (Percentage of Base Salary)............. 2 
Table 2: Accumulated Savings in the AFORE System ...................................................... 3 
Table 3: Transitional and New Generations in the Pension System (Year 2004) .............. 4 
Table 4: Pension Annuity Providers and 2005 Market Shares (Percentage of Market 
Premium)............................................................................................................................. 5 
Table 5: Evolution of Market Structure, 1997–2005.......................................................... 5 
Table 6: Insurance Sector Business Lines Growth, 1997–2005......................................... 6 
Table 7: Pension Annuity Market Growth, 1997–2005...................................................... 7 
Table 8: Evolution of Separate Technical Provisions, 1997–2005 (MXN mln.).............. 12 
Table 9: Investment Limits by Type of Security for Technical Provisions...................... 15 
Table 10: Investment Limits by Type of Issuer for Technical Provisions........................ 16 
Table 11: Investment of Technical Provisions, 1997–2005.............................................. 17 
Table 12: Inflation and Currency Risk in Technical Provisions, 1997–2005................... 17 
Table 13: Average Maturity of Government Bond Portfolio (Years)............................... 18 
Table 14: Average Maturity of Private Sector Bond Portfolio (Years)............................ 18 
Table 15: Evolution of Average Underwriting Costs, MXN Million, 2001–2005........... 22 
Table 16: Evolution of Average Non-Life Loss Ratios in Select Countries (in Percent). 23 
Table 17: Weighting System for Asset Liability Mismatches.......................................... 26 
Table 18: Pension Annuities Solvency and Profitability Indicators (1997–2005) ........... 27 
Table 19: Disability Benefits Under LSS-73 and LSS-97................................................ 30 
Table 20: Monthly Disability Benefit Comparison Under 1973 and 1997 Laws (MXN )31 
Table 21: Choice of IV Benefits Under LSS-73 and LSS-97 For Transitional Cohort.... 33 
Table 22: Regulatory Framework for Pension Annuities (as of May 2006)..................... 41 
 
  - i - Gregorio Impavido 
     
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Evolution of Total Technical Provisions (Real 2005 MXN mln.).................... 12 
Figure 2: Evolution and Financing of Total Assets (Real 2005 MXN mln.).................... 14 
Figure 3: Evolution of Average Underwriting Performance............................................ 22 
Figure 4: Evolution of Sovereign Risk and Inflation........................................................ 24 
Figure 5: Evolution of Investment Performance and Key Interest Rates......................... 25 
Figure 6: Impact of SAR-02 Reform on IV Premium Growth......................................... 31 
 
 -  ii  - The Mexican Pension Annuity Market 
     
INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the performance and development of the Mexican pension 
annuity market established as a consequence of the 1997 pension reform.  The Mexican 
experience displays interesting characteristics providing lessons for other countries that 
still need to design the decumulation phase of their newly established second pillars.  At 
the same time, it raises some technical and policy concerns that need addressing as they 
could hamper, in the future, the healthy development of the market. 
This paper benefited from interviews with officials in the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority (CNSF), the Ministry of Finance (SHCP), the Pension Supervisory Authority 
(CONSAR) and the Social Security Institute (IMSS) as well as with management of 
specialized annuity companies.  It could not have been prepared without the written 
material provided by the CNSF, listed in the reference section at the end of the paper. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section I briefly summarizes the 1992 
and 1997 pension reforms from which the pension annuity market derives.  Section II 
analyzes issues related to: 1) the evolution of the annuity market industrial organization; 
2) annuity product design and competition; 3) the evolution of assets and liabilities of 
specialized annuity companies; 4) the evolution of the regulatory framework; and 5) the 
performance of the market.  Section III analyzes the development prospects of the market 
in light of the 2001 and 2002 amendments of the 1997 social security law.  Conclusions 
and policy recommendations follow. 
I THE 1992 AND 1997 PENSION REFORMS 
In 1992, Mexico reformed the pension system for workers in the private sector
1 and 
in the public sector
2 introducing mandatory defined contribution individual accounts 
complementary to the existing independent defined benefit schemes for public and 
private workers.  The reform is known as SAR-92.  In December 1995, a proposal for a 
new Ley del Seguro Social (LSS-97) was submitted to Congress.  This was passed in the 
same month and was effective as of July 1997.  The reform of 1997 is known as SAR-97 
and covered only private sector workers.  The main component of the second reform was 
the abolition of the old age defined benefit scheme for private sector workers.  As of 
today, pubic sector workers are still covered by a defined benefit scheme. 
Table 1 summarizes the impact that the SAR-92 and SAR-97 reforms had on the old 
benefits managed by the IMSS.  The same table lists in column one the five subaccounts 
for the various benefits provided by the system, these listed in column two.  The SAR-92 
established two individual accounts for old age (retiro) benefits and housing (vivienda).  
The SAR-97 reformed the old defined benefits of disability, old age, and life managed by 
the IMSS.  These were divided into two separate lines of benefits for old age (retiro) and 
severance at advanced age (cesantía en edad avanzada y vejez) in the RCV subaccount, 
on the one hand, and disability and life (invalidez y vida) in the IV subaccount, on the 
other hand.   
                                                 
1 Private sector workers are covered by the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS). 
2 Public sector workers at the federal level are covered by the Instituto De Seguridad Y Servicios Sociales 
De Los Trabajadores Del Estado (ISSSTE). 
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Old age benefits (subaccount RCV) are now defined contribution benefits based on 
individual accounts managed by dedicated pension fund administrators (AFOREs) with 
monies invested in legally independent and dedicated pension mutual funds (SIEFOREs) 
under the supervision of a dedicated pension supervisor (CONSAR).  Contributions to the 
RCV account amount to 6.5 percent of the worker’s base salary plus a flat contribution 
from the federal government of MXN 2.76 per working day as of end of 2005.  
Disability, life and survivorship benefits (subaccount IV) are still defined benefit 
administered by the IMSS but with a revised benefit formula.  Contributions to the IMSS 
for this line of benefit amount to 2.5 percent of the worker’s base salary.  Workers’ 
compensation (subaccount RT) remains administered by the IMSS with variable 
contributions as defined in Article 72 of LSS-97.  Finally, housing (subaccount V) 
contributions amount to 5 percent of the worker’s base salary and are managed by the 
housing financial agency for private sector workers (INFONAVIT) while AFOREs 
conduct record keeping for this account. 
 








1997 – onwards 
Managed during  
accumulation period 
by: 
Retiro 1/  2.0 percent  2.0 percent 
Cesantía y Vejez 2/    4.5 percent  RCV 




IV  Invalidez y Vida 4/  2.5 percent  2.5 percent  IMSS 
RT  Riesgo de Trabajo 
5/  n.a.  Min.  0.25 percent,  
Max.  15 percent  IMSS 
V  Vivienda 1/  5.0 percent  5.0 percent  AFOREs, 
 INFONAVIT 
Notes: 1/ Employer funds 100 percent of this contribution; 2/ Employer funds 3.15 percent, employee funds 
1.125 percent, federal government funds 0.225 percent; 3/ federal government funds 100 percent of this contribution.  
The value reported is indicative of end of 2005.  This is indexed to inflation and updated every quarter; 4/ Employer 
funds 1.75 percent, employee funds 0.625 percent, federal government funds 0.125 percent; Minimum and maximum 
as defined in Article 72 of LSS-97.   
Source: IMSS, CONSAR. 
 
As far as the accumulation phase is concerned, Table 2 summarizes the growth of the 
AFORE system since the 1997 reform.  Currently around 10 percent of GDP is 
accumulated in the new system.  To these reserves, it is necessary to add the reserves 
accumulated by the IMSS for the lines of benefits of IV and RT to have a sense of the 
potential demand for annuity products that can be provided by the private sector. 
As far as the decumulation phase is concerned, the SAR-97 reform treats differently 
members of the “transition cohort” from members of the “new cohort.” If a new entrant 
to the labor force after July 1997 (the so called “new cohort”) becomes disabled or dies, 
she or her beneficiaries must buy an annuity from a private insurance sector specialized 
annuity provider.  If a member of the new cohort retires at old age (65 years or older) or 
due to severance at old age (at least 60 years old) she can choose between a programmed 
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withdrawal offered by an AFORE or an annuity offered by a specialized annuity 
provider.  It is important to mention that, if the accumulated balance at retirement is less 
than what is needed to obtain an annuity greater than or equal to the minimum guaranteed 
pension (PMG), the worker is required to select a programmed withdrawal.  When 



















(% of GDP) 
1998 13  54,470.5  46.7  51,419.0  2.75   
1999 14  104,194.8  331.3  81,039.7  4.03   
2000 13  158,806.2  846.0  110,294.0  4.91   
2001 13  242,242.2  1,513.8  148,148.2  6.74   
2002 11  315,322.4  1,900.5  178,808.2  7.91   
2003 12  392,881.8  2,221.3  210,071.6  8.78   
2004 13  469,145.8  2,031.0  246,336.9  9.40   
2005 18  577,008.7  1,981.4  284,599.1  10.31   
Notes: 1/ As of December of each year.   
Source: CONSAR, IFS. 
 
Members of the transitional cohort with at least one contribution at the time of the reform 
can opt for old age retirement benefits under the provisions of the LSS-73.  If they 
become disabled or die, they or their beneficiaries were originally required to buy an 
annuity from a private insurance sector specialized annuity provider, exactly like 
members of the new cohort.
4  Hence in general, benefits are either provided by private 
sector pension annuity companies or by the IMSS or by the federal government 
depending on the type of benefits and annuitant being considered (more on this is 
provided in section III). 
The rationale behind mandating the purchase of IV and RT benefits in the private sector 
while allowing the transitional cohort the option to choose between the old and new old 
age benefits was related to the fact that, at the time of the reform, old age benefits under 
the LSS-73 were on average more generous than under the LSS-97, RT benefits were 
more or less equivalent under the two laws, and IV benefits were on average more 
generous under the LSS-97 than under the LSS-73.  In addition, this would have allowed 
for the development of a private sector annuity market in Mexico by the time the new 
entrants to the labor force after 1997 started retiring.  These are currently only 37 percent 
of the IMSS members as reported in the next table.   
 
                                                 
3 It is worth mentioning that when a pensioner with a PMG dies, IMSS has to buy a survivor annuity for 
his/her beneficiaries from a private sector annuity provider. 
4 This, as it will be explained later changed in 2002.  Notice also that for simplicity we are not discussing 
the provision of the minimum pension guarantee discussed further in section III. 
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Table 3: Transitional and New Generations in the Pension System (2004) 
Workers Number  Distribution 
Transitional generation  7,743,057  63 percent 
Actual generation  4,604,993  37 percent 
Total 12,348,050  100  percent 
Source: IMSS 
 
Due to the difference in generosity between the old and new old age benefits, it is 
expected that all retirees in the transition cohort will elect the on average more generous 
old age benefits provided for under the LSS-73.  In other words, the short-to-medium 
term prospects for development of the annuity market in Mexico very much depends on 
the accumulated funds in the IV and RT lines of benefits only.   
The next section will analyze the evolution of the pension annuity market as derived from 
the SAR-97 reform between 1998 and end of 2005.  While the term “pension annuities” 
is used to indicate all annuities derived from the SAR-97 reform, it is often used to 
indicate the only de facto existing market of IV and RT annuities.  The market for old age 
(retirement) annuities is currently non-existing due to the fact that workers at the time of 
the reform have the option to elect the (on average) more generous old age benefits under 
the pre-reform provisions (see more on this issue in section III).  Therefore, in the rest of 
this paper the term “annuity” will be used for IV and RT annuities, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
II THE MARKET FOR PENSION ANNUITIES 
II.A  Market Structure and Growth 
With the SAR-97 reform 13 insurance companies were licensed to provide pension 
annuity benefits in 1997.  At the end of 2005, 11 specialized pension annuity companies 
were active in the market.  Seven of these companies were subsidiaries of foreign 
companies (F) whilst four companies were part of financial groups (GF).  The following 
table lists the companies operating in the market as of end of 2005 and their market 
shares in term of written premiums. 
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Table 4: Pension Annuity Providers and 2005 Market Shares (Percentage of Market 
Premium) 
Company  Market share 
Pensiones BBVA Bancomer, S.A.  de C.V., Grupo Financiero BBVA Bancomer 1/ 2/  19.7 
Pensiones Inbursa, S.A., Grupo Financiero Inbursa 2/  17.0 
Profuturo GNP Pensiones, S.A.  de C.V.  15.6 
Pensiones Banamex, S.A.  de C.V., Grupo Financiero Banamex 1/ 2/  10.5 
Pensiones Banorte Generali, S.A.  de C.V., Grupo Financiero Banorte 2/  9.0 
HSBC Pensiones, SA.  1/  6.8 
Pensiones Comercial América, S.A.  de C.V.  6.6 
Metlife Pensiones México, S.A.  1/  6.1 
Principal Pensiones, S.A.  de C.V.  1/  4.4 
Allianz Rentas Vitalicias, S.A.  1/  2.9 
Royal & SunAlliance Pensiones (México), S.A.  de C.V.  1/  1.4 
Total  100.0 
Note: 1/ Foreign subsidiary; 2/ Belonging to a financial group. 
Source: CNSF 
 
The structure of the market changed in the first nine years of operation in two main ways.  
Initially, the 1997 LGISMS reform stated that insurance companies licensed to practice 
life insurance were allowed to offer pension annuities for a five years transition period.  
After that period, those insurance companies would have had to separate annuities 
operations in specialized pension annuity companies.  The 1997 LGISMS also 
established that, during this transitional period new insurance companies that would like 
to offer pension annuities would be licensed as specialized insurers.  While in 1997 50 
percent of the companies licensed where composite companies, after 2002 only 
specialized companies were left operating in the market.  The rationale for the choice of 
specialized annuity providers was, on one hand, to avoid the contagion effect from 
composite life and non-life insurance companies operating annuities, and on the other 
hand, the implicit government guarantee associated with a benefit provision for which 
participation was mandated by the federal government.  Notwithstanding the political 
economy argument of the choice, general life insurance companies would have been 
better placed to hedge the systemic improvements in longevity risk in the annuitant 
portfolio with the mortality risk in the pure life portfolio. 
Another way in which market changed over the year is reflected by the increased 
importance of subsidiaries (especially foreign) and a decreased importance of financial 
groups.  The following table summarizes the changes in market structured that took place 
since the SAR-97 reform. 
 
Table 5: Evolution of Market Structure (1997–2005) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Foreign  Subsidiaries  4 4 5 5 5 7 6 7 7 
Local  Financial  Groups  6 5 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 
Other  3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 
CR5  (percent)  85.3 77.0 73.7 71.4 72.2 72.0 72.5 72.9 71.8 
Source: CNSF 
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Market concentration has been decreasing but remains fairly high.  The participation of 
the largest five providers in total gross premium written (CR5) has decreased from 
85 percent to 72 percent between 1997 and 2001 and remained stable since that year. 
The pension annuity market in Mexico is very small.  This is due to the fact that the 
pension reform that created it was conducted only in 1997 and because the Mexican 
insurance market in general has low penetration and density (1.7 percent of GDP and 
MXN 1,389 per capita, respectively in 2005).  Table 6 reports the evolution of the major 
business lines of the Mexican insurance market between 1997 and 2005.  The gross 
premium related to the annuity market increased from 3.2 percent to 13.2 percent of total 
insurance gross premium income between 1997 and 2001 while it decreased again to 3.3 
percent in December 2005. 
 
Table 6: Insurance Sector Business Lines Growth (1997–2005) 
(Percent) 1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Motor    25.8  25.5 23.8  25 24.7 24.2 26.9 24.4 25.1 
Other  P&C 25.9  20.4  18 16.8 17.4 18.5 21.4 20.3 18.9 
Life    35.2  31.7 36.1 34.2 33.7 39.1  36 38.9 37.9 
Accidents & 
Health  9.8 8.9  9.4 10.6 10.9 10.9 12.9 12.7 14.8 




78,639 94,811 101,001 110,320 125,699 140,928 128,063 142,640 138,377 
GPI/GDP 
(percent)  1.3  1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 
GPI/Pop.  
(MXN)  839  999 1,051 1,133 1,273 1,408 1,263 1,389 1,331 
Notes: 1/ Real 2005 pesos.. 
Source: CNSF, IFS, WDI.   
 
Table 7 summarizes the growth of the pension annuity market in terms of key variables 
between 1997 and 2005.  The number of annuitants for the benefits of IV and RT 
increased every year between 1997 and 2002.  Afterwards, figures decreased sharply.  
The number of eligible annuitants increased from 6,068 in 1997 to 30,778 in 2001.  The 
number of individuals who had bought a pension annuity from private sector providers 
increased from 4,410 in 1997 to 30,824 in 2001.  In the ensuing years the number of 
eligible individuals and actual annuitants decreased to around 7,900 in 2005. 
The same pattern can be observed in the value of pension annuity premiums with the 
exception of 2004 when a spike in premiums written can be observed.
5 Between 1997 
and 2001, gross written premium increased from MXN 2,522 million (annualized) to 
MXN 16,641 million.  In the ensuing months it decreased to reach MXN 4,504 million in 
                                                 
5 That was due to an amendment to the LSS-97 that increased the pension amount to those pensioners 
satisfying the legal requirements established by that amendment.  This implied a transfer of almost $1,700 
million MXN of single premium to the annuities companies. 
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2005.  The 2004 increase in premiums was due to an increase in IV and RT pension 
annuities approved by the congress in that year that required retroactive payments for 
insured individuals as of March 2004.  Within the period between 1997 and 2005 the 
share of premiums for IV benefits decreased from 96 percent of total premiums in 1997 
to 85 percent in 2005. 
 
Table 7: Pension Annuity Market Growth (1997–2005) 
  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005 
Eligible  Insured  6,068 23,905 24,782 27,384 30,778 14,879 5,998 6,365 7,917 
Annuitants  4,410 23,457 24,599 27,188 30,824 15,798 6,153 6,187 7,927 
GPI (MXN mln.) 
1/  2,522 12,913 13,389 14,529 16,641 10,261 3,497 5,225 4,504 
 o/w IV (percent)  96  90  87  86  86  86  86  85  85 
GPI/GDP  (percent)  0.08 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.16  0.05  0.07  0.05 
GPI/Pop.    (MXN  )  26.9 139.0 139.3 149.0 168.3 102.4 34.4 50.8 43.6 
Notes: 1/ Real 2005 Pesos. 
Source: CNSF, IFS, WDI.   
 
Pension annuity market penetration increased from 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent of GDP 
between 1997 and 2001 while afterwards it decreased until reaching five basis points in 
December 2005.  Again a similar pattern can be observed in terms of market density. 
Section III of this paper provides a detailed discussion of the factors behind the 
mentioned major change in the trends in the pension annuity market after 2001/2002. 
 
II.B  Pension Annuity Products, Pricing, and Competition 
Pension annuities stemming from the 1997 reform are all immediate premium level 
annuities indexed to inflation (CNSF 2006g).  The products have two components: (1) an 
annuity for retirement, unemployment at old age, disability, incapacity, worker’s 
compensation, orphans, widows and widowers; and (2) a survivor benefit for eventual 
beneficiaries existing when the right to a pension annuity is acquired.  In calculating 
premiums, pension annuity companies calculate separately the premium related to the 
annuity and the premium related to the survivor benefit.  The calculation of the survivor 
benefit considers the death conditional probability of the pensioner. 
Two sets of gender specific mortality tables are used for insured members that are 
disabled or not disabled and a unique technical rate of 3.5 percent real has to be used.  
For male and female disabled pensioners (IV benefits), the two mortality tables used are 
the EMSSIM-97 and the EMSSIH-97, respectively.  These tables were developed by the 
IMSS.  For non-disabled male and female pensioners the mortality tables used are the 
EMSSAM-97 and EMSSAH-97, respectively.  These tables were prepared by the CNSF 
on the basis of information provided by the Population National College (CONAPO).  
These are gender specific dynamic tables approved by the special committee formed 
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under Art 81 of the LSAR for this purpose (CNSF 2006).  The methodology used for the 
creation of these tables was revised by the Mexican College of Actuaries (CONAC).
6
Other factors influence the pricing of annuities.  Since annuities are indexed every 
February to the inflation of the previous fiscal year a system of factors was developed to 
consider that: (1) it is possible the month of February falls between the date in which the 
insured individual acquires pension rights and the date when the IMSS declares the 
insured individual disabled; (2) pension benefits can be granted at any time during the 
month and companies need to credit the inflation every month.  In addition, two types of 
mark ups are added to the premium: (1) a 2 percent mark-up (which is accumulated in the 
contingency reserve discussed in section II.C) is added to the premium as an extra buffer 
to compensate for possible statistical deviations in the mortality table; and (2) a 1 percent 
mark-up is added to finance acquisition costs incurred during the sale of the annuity and 
administration costs incurred during the payment of the annuity. 
Since demographic and technical parameters used for pricing annuities are fixed by 
regulations, any new annuitant has access to the same IV and RT annuity irrespectively 
of the provider elected.  This is ensured by a requirement for all companies to use a single 
pricing system (known as “SUC”
7) for calculating immediate premiums.  This is nothing 
more than a piece of software that captures the relevant data of the individual and his/her 
beneficiaries and uses all pricing parameters prescribed by regulations.  The rationale 
behind the single methodology for pricing annuities is related to the fact that on the one 
hand, the LSS-97 establishes defined benefit for IV and RT pensions, and on the other 
hand, it grants the right to pensioners to choose an annuity company.  In addition, this 
methodology strives at eliminating unfair commercial practices towards retirees and 
towards the IMSS that ultimately pays premiums through its accumulated IV reserves.   
In order to compete for clients, companies offer additional benefits to the basic IV and 
RT annuities.  In the case of life insurance benefits, the annuities companies have to 
purchase additional benefits from other insurance companies authorized to operate life 
insurance business.  Notice that the offer of additional benefits does not affect the price 
offered to the insured individual for the basic pension benefit.  In other words, companies 
absorb all costs for additional benefits and finance them through the spread between the 
technical rate and the expected return on assets. 
These additional benefits are tightly regulated in order to ensure that they are in line with 
the solvency profile of the company, and to avoid undue commercial practices.  
Additional benefits need to be registered in the CNSF before being offered to the 
pensioners.  The additional benefits registered at the CNSF are posted on its website.  
They can only fall in one of two categories: 1) additional economic benefits constituting 
increments on the basic pension; and 2) life insurance products bought for the pensioner 
or their beneficiaries.  In general, additional benefits can be offered during the duration of 
the basic pension benefit.  In the case of additional economic benefits, pension annuity 
companies are required to constitute the corresponding reserves
8 considering a technical 
interest rate of 1 percent in real terms.  In addition, life insurance benefits have to be 
                                                 
6 Colegio Nacional de Actuarios de México (CONAC) 
7 Sistema Único de Cotización (SUC). 
8 More precisely, this is the mathematical or net premium reserve as it will be explained in section II. 
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purchased from other insurance companies paying a single premium, and this amount is 
registered as acquisition cost of the annuity company.
9 It is important to point out that the 
same mortality table used for basic benefits is used for additional economic benefits 
(CNSF 2006h). 
The regulatory framework for pricing of pension annuities in Mexico has the potential for 
making the basic annuity offered an unbalanced product.  This is a risk for both providers 
and annuitants. 
For providers there is a concrete possibility that technical profit margins are quickly 
eroded if technical rates are not adjusted rapidly.  For instance, the long term real interest 
rate in the case of 10 yr Udibonos
10 has decreased from around 7.14 percent in October 
1999 to 4.30 percent in December 2005 and has been increasing gradually to reach a level 
of 5.09 percent in June 2006
11; in the case of 20 and 30 yr PICs
12 the long term real 
interest rates have passed from 6.14 and 6.12 in October 2001 to 5.96 and 5.92 in 
November 2002 respectively and in the case of 20 and 30 yr CBICs
13 the long term real 
interest rates decreased from 6.16 and 6.21 percent in January 2003 to 4.59 and 4.68 
percent in December 2005 in that order; while the technical rate of 3.5 percent real has 
not been modified (see section II.E). 
The mortality tables used are experimental tables based on population averages and 
annuity companies would need to develop their own annuitant mortality tables when 
sufficient mortality experience is accumulated.  This is especially urgent since pension 
policy changes introduced in 2002 have altered the demographic assumptions at the basis 
of the pricing framework adopted in 1997 so that the IV annuitant pool is quickly 
degenerating (see section III).  Since 2000 the CNSF has prepared some studies in order 
to analyze the adequacy of the experimental market tables.  However since 2002, the 
trends of the mortality have changed and it is necessary to collect statistical market 
information for at least five years to propose a new table. 
 
                                                 
9 In the case of life insurance benefits the corresponding reserves are constituted by the life insurance 
companies (sellers). 
10 Pension annuity companies have large positions of government bonds known as UDIBONOS (Bonos De 
Desarrollo Del Gobierno Federal Denominados En Unidades De Inversión), PICs (Pagarés de 
Indemnización Carretera con aval del Gobierno Federal) and CBICs (Certificados Bursátiles de 
Indemnización Carretera con aval del Gobierno Federal) that have maturities between seven and 28 years. 
11 For 10 year UDIBONOS, the auctions average result reached the lowest real annual interest rate level 
(3.89 percent) in October 2003.  Source: Banxico. 
12 The highway indemnification promissory notes, know as PICs were issued until December 2002, as part 
of the support program for the rescue of the highways under Concession.  These notes were endorsed by the 
federal government.  The annual interest rates correspond to the auctions results.  Source: Banxico and 
Banobras. 
13 CBICs were issued since January 2003.  The interest rate considered is the CBIC real annual interest rate 
of the monthly auctions results.  Source: Banxico and Banobras. 
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Box 1: Chilean Annuities Are Good Value Products Even With Price Deregulation 
Contrary to the Mexico case, pricing of Chilean pension annuities is not regulated.  Consequently, prices 
varies over time and across individuals.  In Chile there is evidence that annuities with longer expected 
durations have lower money’s worth ratios than annuities with shorter expected durations, and that larger 
premiums buy annuities that on average are of better value than smaller ones.  This is consistent with the 
view that insurers are concerned with the higher reinvestment and mortality risks presented by long 
durations and, in the case of size, the effect of fixed expense loadings.  Also, nearly half of the variation in 
individual money’s worth ratios is not explained by individual characteristics.  The wide spread between 
the highest and the lowest annuity is intriguing, and is specially wide for lower premium annuities, 
indicating that market search may be inefficient among lower income retirees.  Finally, annuitants with the 
same characteristics such as age, premium, and gender frequently receive different annuities. 
 
The high variability in money’s worth ratios (especially at low premia) has led to the conclusion that 
brokers and sales agents can unduly influence the selection of products.  This led to the introduction of a 
new electronic quotation system designed to improve transparency in the market for retirement products, 
and ensure that retirees effectively obtain the best quotes.  This is an innovative and promising reform, the 
results of which should be closely monitored by regulators in other countries.  The recent introduction of 
caps on broker commissions proved controversial but is another experience that merits close monitoring as 
well. 
 
The variability in annuity prices in Chile should not suggest that prices should not be de-regulated in 
Mexico.  Despite price variation, Chilean annuitants have generally received a good value for their premia 
so far, as indicated by average money’s worth ratios on their indexed annuities around 1.04 – 1.08 in recent 
years.  These are significantly higher than the unitary value considered as an actuarially fair annuity. 
 
Average money’s worth ratios in Chile have been high by international comparison.  In most other 
countries money’s worth ratios range from 0.9 to 1 for nominal annuities, and from 0.8 to 0.85 for indexed 
annuities, in the few countries that offer inflation protection, such as the UK.  The higher money’s worth 
ratios of indexed annuities in Chile are in part due to the availability of a large supply of financial assets 
indexed to prices, including higher yield assets such as mortgage, corporate and infrastructure bonds.  This 
has allowed annuity providers to hedge inflation risk efficiently while also extracting higher real returns 
and sharing them with annuitants. 
 
Such high ratios are considered the result of a very competitive environment but likely to be unsustainable 
in the long run.  Despite the fact that ratios will need adjusting in the future, they are likely to remain 
competitive if compared internationally. 
 
 
Finally, the fixed pricing rules, determined by the legal constrains mentioned previously, 
may expose annuitants to undesired “provider risk” as the solvency situation of any given 
company is not reflected in the price of the annuity it offers.
14 In a low long term real 
interest rate environment and without the timely adjustment of the regulatory technical 
                                                 
14 Clearly this observation should be weighted by the fact that product pricing is the result of complex 
interactions between operational objectives of a company, such as profit, market share and market 
positioning, and security objectives, such as reinsurance, investment philosophy and reserving (when not 
regulated).  When companies are free to charge prices on the basis of sound rates, these prices are usually 
more dynamic and their relationship to sound rates may vary from time to time with the state of the market 
and with the expectations of management and shareholders.  In other words, prices may not need to always 
reflect the solvency situation (although they are expected to be highly correlated with it) of a company.   
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rate, the inability of companies to establish sound premium rates
15 may expose 
themselves and annuitants to undesirable level of risk. 
For annuitants, fixed technical parameters are no guarantee of good value products in an 
environment of changing circumstances.
16 The Chilean experience, reported in the Box 1, 
would suggest that annuitants can receive a good value for their premia in a highly 
competitive and efficient market even if technical parameters are deregulated. 
 
II.C  Evolution of Liabilities 
Mexican pension annuity providers need to form a variety of technical provisions
17 
for both pension and additional benefits.
18 Due to the fact that pension annuities are all 
immediate premium annuities, the largest provision is obviously the net mathematical (or 
premium) reserve (NPR) (reserva de riesgos en curso).
19 This is formed with the 
immediate premium of IV and RT benefits and it backs the provision of annuities 
considering a technical rate of 3.5 percent in real terms.  Companies have also to 
constitute the premium reserve corresponding to additional economic benefits in which 
case the use of a technical rate of 1 percent in real terms is required.  The NPR reserve is 
gradually “earned” when benefits are paid and it has always represented between 95 
percent and 97 percent of total reserves in the 1997 – 2005 period.  The contingency 
reserve (reserva de contingencia o de previsión) is used to cover possible statistical 
deviations in the expected loss ratio and it is formed with 2 percent of the mathematical 
reserves for basic pension and additional benefits.
20 The special mathematical reserve for 
basic pension benefits (reserve matemática especial) is used to cover possible systemic 
improvements in the longevity of the annuitant pool for non disabled pensioners.  The 
reserve for fluctuation in investments (reserva para las fluctuaciones en inversiones) is 
used to cover for unexpected fluctuations in the return on the investment of the reserves.  
This reserve is constituted by a portion of the excess investment rate of return of the 
market portfolio over the technical interest rate (3.5 percent real).  Finally, the loss 
reserve (reserva para obligaciones pendientes de cumplir), is used for liabilities that 
providers have with their pensioners.  The next table reports the behavior of the different 
types of reserves just mentioned within the period 1997 – 2005. 
 
                                                 
15 Sound rates are based on sound insurance principles and have regard to the portfolio being written and 
the changing social, economic, legislative and technological environment. 
16 Which in the case of mexico is simply determined by the defined benefit nature of the IV and RT 
pensions.   
17 The methods for the formation of such reserves are detailed in SHCP (1997). 
18 The share of technical provisions for additional benefits was only 2 percent in 2005. 
19 The NPR is the long plan equivalent of the unearned premium reserve (UPR) for P&C insurers. 
20 Annuity premiums include a 3 percent of surcharge composed by 2 percent for mortality deviations and 
1 percent for administrative and acquisition cost.   
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Table 8: Evolution of Separate Technical Provisions (1997–2005, MXN mln.) 
1/  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
NPR  2,332.4 14,774.8 27,417.3 40,728.7 55,791.0 63,875.1 65,429.0 68,592.6 70,624.7 
Pending  NPR 51.5 37.2 55.3 60.8 43.2 10.6 7.20 10.8  7.5 
Contingency  46.7 295.0 548.3 814.5  1,115.0 1,277.0 1,308.0 1,371.0 1,412.0 
Special Mat.  0.3  9.6  32.7  82.1 139.5 226.2 315.5 445.0 574.4 
Inv.  Fluct.  1.8  33.7  156.2 234.1 333.6 628.0 744.9 747.1 817.8 
Loss Reserves.  7.4  9.7  15.2  33.8  70.6  97.1 133.2 167.5 203.6 
NPR/Total  (%)  96    97 97 97 97 97 96 96 96 
Notes: 1/ Real 2005 Pesos. 
Source: CNSF 
 
Technical provisions also display a similar pattern of high growth until 2001 and much 
lower growth afterwards reported before for premiums in section II.A.  Between 1997 
and 2001 technical provisions increased from MXN 2,440 million to MXN 57,493 
million while reaching only MXN 73,640.41 in December 2005 as shown in Figure 1. 
 


















































A major change was introduced in 2002 in the regulation with respect to the valuation of 
technical provisions of life, accident and illness, and P&C lines of businesses by 
amending Article 47 of the Insurance Law (LGISMS).  In essence, the new rules state 
that the valuation of technical provisions has to be conducted on the basis of actuarial 
standards requiring an actuarial valuation of future risks.
21 In the case of annuities, it was 
                                                 
21 Regarding the unearned premium reserve for all lines of business (excepting annuities) the old 
methodology for the calculation and valuation of the technical reserves was based on premiums.  Insurance 
companies that followed this regulation scheme could face actuarial insufficiency of technical reserves, 
because reserves relayed only on the adequacy of premiums.  Consequently, if the risk premium was 
insufficient to pay claims, the technical reserve would also be insufficient.  In addition, in high competitive 
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established in 1997 that the valuation of technical provisions should be made on the basis 
of the actuarial methodology issued by the Ministry of Finance.
22 For pension annuity 
companies that underwrite inflation indexed products, the methodology applicable to the 
formation of the net premium reserve includes additional provisions aimed at avoiding 
eventual revaluation of the reserve due to changes in inflation.
23 In all cases, since 2004, 
the valuation of the technical provision must be reviewed and signed by an actuary that 
must be certified by the National College of Actuaries (CONAC) or approved by the 
CNSF.  Consequently, standards of actuarial practices where developed by the CONAC, 
and one of them indicates the principles that actuaries must apply to calculate the 
technical provisions.  These standards were published by the CNSF in Circulares S- 
10.1.8 and F-6.6.4. 
 
II.D  Evolution of Assets and Investment 
Total assets in the pension annuity market follow closely the behavior of liabilities 
given the long term nature of the pension annuity business.  For instance, average total 
assets in the last nine years have been 90 percent financed by liabilities and only 10 
percent by paid up capital. The liability share is clearly increasing with time until the 
                                                                                                                                                 
markets some insurers would lower premiums in order to retain costumers, making it difficult to control if 
premiums are exactly associated to the risk assumed by the insurance companies.  (Premium manipulation 
does not relate to the annuity market as pricing parameters are fixed by regulation.  The observation made 
relates to the general rationale behind the choice to change accumulation and valuation methodologies for 
the whole insurance industry).  The new rules (CNSF 2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, and 2005) containing 
specific instructions for the actuarial valuation of the NPR were implemented in 2004.  All companies are 
now required, for each line of business, to file with the CNSF an actuarial methodology for the valuation of 
the adequacy of reserves.  Regulations also include a minimum requirement level for the technical 
provisions.  In the case of claims reserves, companies are also required to use an actuarial method for the 
estimation of reported claims without a precise valuation of the loss (CNSF 2003c).  The methodology 
must estimate the technical provisions as the expected value of future claims derived from all the policies in 
force from the valuation date until the expiration date of every policy.  The methodology must specify a 
projection model of future claims, based on the trends of claims observed by the company in the previous 
years.  In case a company does not have adequate statistical data, it must file a temporary methodology also 
approved by the CNSF who also has the power to assign a methodology for as long the company files one 
considered as adequate. 
22 This methodology is detailed in SHCP (2000). 
23 Notice that liabilities are inflation indexed by regulation.  Hence, the methodology for forming the NPR 
needs containing an element that neutralizes the effect of the revaluation of the reserve due to changes in 








1 i INPC C GPI V V m m m m m + Δ + − + = −
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where V  is the NPR reserve at the end of month m;   is the NPR reserve at the end of the previous 
month;   is the gross premium income of the policies issued during the month m; C are the claims 
paid during the month m;   is the change in the price index during the month m; and i is the 
technical rate of 3.5 percent real that companies need to use in pricing their product.  The difference 
 is the monthly minimum accumulation rate (rendimiento mínimo acreditable) that 
companies need to use to form the UPR reserve.  Notice that the use of ½ for premiums and claims implies 
that these are uniformly distributed within the month. 
  - 13 - Gregorio Impavido 
     
annuitant population matures.  Since assets closely follow the pattern of liabilities, assets 
too grew rapidly until 2001 and less rapidly since then due to the decreased income after 
that year as previously reported for premiums and technical provisions.  In the first five 
years since the reform, total assets reached MXN 60,000 million while in the last four 
years they increase about only MXN 21,000 million. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of total assets and its sources of financing: liabilities and 
capital.  Notice that the drastic increase in capital registered in 2003 was due the decision 
of one company to transfer to capital excess resources and results in participation in 
subsidiaries.  The same company in 2004 registered another increment in capital as a 
result of its participation in subsidiaries.  In 2005, the same company disinvested around 
MXN 7 billion.  Due to the fact that capital excess resources were stocks not listed on the 
Mexican stock exchange market, there was no effect on the solvency of the annuity 
market. 
 











1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005




Investment of technical provisions of pension annuity companies is subject to the same 
rules applicable to other insurance companies in Mexico.  The regulatory framework for 
investments of technical provisions is contained in the RIRT (CNSF 2000) and 
Circulares S-11.1 to S-11.6, which in turn, expand on the general provisions contained in 
Articles 56, 57, 58, 59, 81 (Cap II, III and IV), 82 (Cap XIV), 91 and 92 of the Insurance 
Law (LGISMS).  Such framework regulates the formation and operations of the 
investment committee, the list of assets that are admitted in representation (to cover) 
liabilities, rates for private companies’ values, currency and duration matching, custody 
requirements, investment administration and investment limits per issuer or security type.  
In what follows, we focus on admitted assets, investment limits, liquidity requirements, 
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custody and investment administration, inflation and duration matching rules, and credit 
risk limits. 
Admitted assets⎯According to the RIRT, assets admitted in representation of liabilities 
must belong to the following list (CNSF 2006a): 
•  Securities registered in the SIC of the Mexican Stock Exchange. 
•  Investments in equity and fixed income mutual funds with portfolios that include 
foreign securities issued by Central Banks or any other level of government by 
countries of the European Union, or countries belonging to the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
as well as securities that are registered, authorized or regulated for general public 
sale by the Banking and Securities National Commission (CNBV) or the 
equivalent organizations of the above mentioned countries.   
•  Securities denominated in national currency issued by international financial 
institutions in which Mexico is a member.   
•  Private equity investment funds in Equity Investment Societies (Sociedades de 
Inversión de Capitales, SINCAS), as well as in trusts whose purpose is to 
capitalize firms. 
It is important to notice that investment rules also include the following requirements: 
Investment limits⎯Investment limits comprise both limits, by type of instrument and by 
issuer, as summarized in the next two tables.   
 
Table 9: Investment Limits by Type of Security for Technical Provisions 
Investment type  Limit (in percent) 
(1) Papers issued or backed by the federal government  100 
(2) Papers issued or backed by credit institutions or international 
financial bodies 
60 
(3) Papers issued by SINCAS  1 
(4) Papers issued or backed by institutions different from those in (1), 
(2), and (3)  
30 
(5) Papers issued or backed by institutions different from those in (1), 
(2), and (3) exchange at the Mexican Stock Exchange 
5 
(6) Discount and rediscount operations  5 
(7) Credit with pledge bonds or papers guarantee  5 
(8) Credit with mortgage guarantee  5 
(9) Real state properties  25 
(10) Repurchasing   30 
(11) Foreign debt papers  2 
Source: RIRT and CNSF (2006b).   
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Table 10: Investment Limits by Type of Issuer for Technical Provisions 
Investment type  Limit (in percent) 
(1) Federal government  100.0 
(2) Banks or international financial bodies  18.0 
(3) SINCAS  0.5 
(4) Institutions different from those in (1), (2), and (3)   7.0 
(5) Groups and institutions in the same economic sector (shares) 1/ 2/
  10.0 
(6) Financial institution (shares)
 1/ 5.0 
(7) Stock and papers issued inter-related groups  18.0 
(8) Foreign securities belonging to investment funds  1.0 
(9) Securities registered in the SIC (Sistema Internacional de 
Cotizaciones) of the Mexican Stock Exchange. 
1.0 
Notes: 1/ Constitute standard risk for mutual insurance companies; 2/ For manufacturing, this limit can 
reach up to 20 percent. 
Source: RIRT and CNSF (2006b).   
 
Liquidity requirements⎯In order for investment portfolios to maintain an adequate 
degree of liquidity, companies must cover short term technical reserves with equivalent 
assets.  The determination of these short term obligations is obtained by assigning a 
percentage short term requirement to each type of reserve and the total must be covered 
with investments with maturities of a year or less or equity shares classified as highly 
traded.  The shares of reserves that have to be invested in liquid instruments used to be 
based on prudent limits that varied from 100 percent for the loss reserve to 6 percent for 
the NPR, the contingency and the special mathematical reserves.  Starting with 2006, 
liquidity requirements must be calculated according to the calculation derived from the 
asset⎯matching analysis for the pensions. 
In addition, liquidity requirements for life operation must be calculated for each type of 
life insurance policies issued by companies and more specifically taking into account the 
proportion of technical provisions generated from short term insurance policies relatively 
to the proportion of technical provisions generated from long term life insurance. 
Custody and investment administration⎯All titles and securities referred in the 
regulations and issued in the country must be administered by credit institutions or 
securities firms, and must be kept in custody by depository institutions for securities.  In 
the case of investments in foreign currency operated outside the country, only Mexican 
Financial Entities or its subsidiaries may act as intermediaries which may use, as 
custodians, the authorized depositary entities in the applicable jurisdiction in the foreign 
country. 
Matching rules⎯Solvency Margin Rules (Reglas para el Capital Mínimo de Garantía 
de las Instituciones de Seguros) were amended to include the matching of assets and 
liabilities for life insurance starting in January, 2006.  For pension annuity companies 
these rules were established in 2000 and include duration, inflation and currency 
matching of liabilities and assets admitted in their representation.  In general terms, for 
the annuity companies, obligations must be covered by assets same currency (indexed to 
the inflation) although there are specific exceptions: 
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•  Before 1999 investment rules prescribed the investment of technical reserve only 
in inflation indexed instruments.  After 1999, companies were allowed to invest in 
nominal instruments with yield higher than inflation as long as they acquire 
derivative products to cover the inflation risk.  After the year 2000 companies 
were allowed to invest up to 10 percent of technical reserves in foreign currency 
instruments issued or guaranteed by the federal government. 
•  Institutions may cover obligations in foreign currency with their equivalent in 
local currency by means of acquiring derivative products exclusively for covering 
exchange rate risk with authorized intermediaries and recognized markets by the 
Central Bank. 
Credit risk rules⎯In order to minimize the risk, all private debt securities as well as 
titles in investment funds used by insurance companies to cover technical reserves must 
have a minimum acceptable rating determined by a rating agency approved by the 
Banking and Securities National Commission (CNBV). 
The following table reports the evolution of investment of technical reserves.  Most of the 
provisions are invested in government bonds.  Companies are required to fully hedge 
inflation and interest rate risk and only a very small currency mismatch is allowed by 
regulation between assets and liabilities.  Since private sector issuers of inflation linked 
long term bonds are essentially non existent, this is done by purchasing inflation linked 
instruments with long maturities that are mostly issued by the federal government. 
 
Table 11: Investment of Technical Provisions (1997–2005) 
(percent) 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Other  Inv.    1.5 1.5 4.7 4.9 6.8 7.8  10.6  15.3  11.8 
Private  Sec.  20.0 16.3 10.4 14.4 10.4 11.6 15.7 16.2 11.9 
Government  Sec.  78.5 82.2 84.9 80.7 82.8 80.6 73.7 68.5 76.3 
Total  (MXN  mln.)  /1 3,602 16,191 29,713 43,743 60,039 69,061 78,112 84,112 79,852 
Notes: 1/ constant prices as of Dec 2005. 
Source: CNSF 
 
The following table reports instead how the investment of technical reserves has shifted 
over time from nominal and foreign assets to real and domestic assets; thus considerably 
reducing exposure to inflation and currency risk. 
 
Table 12: Inflation and Currency Risk in Technical Provisions (1997–2005) 
(percent) 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Local  nominal  36.1  40.7  14.0 4.0 5.1 4.8 0.2 0.5 0.4 
Foreign  nominal  3.9 1.3 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 3.6 0.8 
Local real  60.0  58.0 84.4 93.1 92.2 92.6 97.4 94.2 91.3 
Local  and  foreign  nominal  1/  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.7 7.6 
Notes: 1/ with inflation rate guaranteed. 
Source: CNSF 
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For accounting purposes investment portfolios can be classified in two types: (1) for sale; 
and (2) to hold until maturity.  The first type of portfolio is used to finance operations and 
short term liabilities such as acquisition or operation costs and payment of benefits.  Due 
to the short term nature of this portfolio assets are marked to market.  The second type of 
portfolio is used to back longer term liabilities, the valuation of which is based on a 
constant discount rate.  It is natural to classify in these circumstances all reserves in at 
least the UPR as held to maturity.  Due to the nature of this portfolio, assets are valued at 
maturity.  On average, 90 percent of the portfolio of pension annuity companies is 
classified as “held to maturity.” Always for accounting purposes, liabilities regarding 
basic benefits are valued at the fixed technical interest rate defined in regulations which is 
currently 3.5 percent real. 
However, in economic terms companies are required to set up asset liability management 
policies and hedge interest rate risk by matching assets with liabilities by the use of 
duration metrics.  It was not possible to collect information on the evolution of the 
average duration mismatch between assets and liabilities.  However, it was possible to 
collect information about the evolution of the average maturity of government and private 
sector bonds reported in the following two tables: 
 
Table 13: Average Maturity of Government Bond Portfolio (Years) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
y  <=  1  0.00 0.00 0.38 0.39 0.52 0.23 0.18 0.27 0.26 
1<  y  <=  5    3.42 3.09 2.96 2.43 2.24 3.83 3.03 3.32 2.48 
5 < y <= 10  8.71  7.11  8.01  7.73  6.78  8.29  7.29  7.36  6.73 
10 < y <= 15   12.36  12.30  12.15  11.63  10.63  13.72  13.18  12.74  12.34 
y  >  15  31.88 30.76 29.74 28.86 26.23 25.77 25.30 24.44 23.90 
Total  Government  6.14  7.51  6.73 13.07 14.71 16.36 14.76 14.88 14.53 
Total  bond  portfolio  5.80  7.30  6.50 11.80 13.70 15.00 13.40 13.60 14.20 
Source: CNSF 
 
Table 14: Average Maturity of Private Sector Bond Portfolio (Years) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
y  <=  1  0.00 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.46 0.36 0.24 0.51 
1< y <= 5   3.09  3.34  2.14  3.27  4.11  3.95  3.40  2.55  1.97 
5 < y <= 10  9.65  6.99  6.72  6.50  6.98  7.61  7.29  7.46  6.99 
10  <  y  <=  15    13.59 11.80 11.94 11.04 11.93 14.33 12.65 14.05 13.79 
y  >  15  0.00  0.00 16.01  - 19.98 17.39 16.31 23.06 22.13 
Total  Private  Sector  3.70 6.53 2.81 5.04 5.89 5.81 4.71 6.94  11.51 
Total  bond  portfolio  5.80  7.30  6.50 11.80 13.70 15.00 13.40 13.60 14.20 
Source: CNSF 
 
Notice that average maturity of the whole bond portfolio has been increasing in the last 
nine years from less than six years to more than 14 years.  The increase is more 
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noticeable in the year 2000 when asset liability matching rules were introduced as part of 
the solvency margin calculation for annuity companies.  While maturity of assets has 
increased, the average maturity of the liabilities, estimated with the expected longevity is 
of 37 years. 
Given the maturity mismatch mentioned above, it is safe to assume also a duration 
mismatch between assets and liabilities and therefore, provide a preliminary assessment 
on the duration methodology used for measuring, monitoring and managing interest rate 
risk by pension annuity companies.  Duration (modified, or Macauly) is a good measure 
of sensitivity to marginal changes in interest rates of option-free bond portfolios.  
Duration is typically defined as the approximate percentage change in the price for a 100 
basis point parallel shift in the yield curve.  Pension annuity companies have large 
positions of government bonds known as UDIBONOS (Bonos De Desarrollo Del 
Gobierno Federal Denominados En Unidades De Inversión), PICs (Pagarés de 
Indemnización Carretera con aval del Gobierno Federal) and CBICs (Certificados 
Bursátiles de Indemnización Carretera con aval del Gobierno Federal) that have 
maturities between seven and 28 years.  These are fixed coupon non-callable bonds and 
therefore have no embedded options.
24 In other words, measuring the interest sensitivity 
of a portfolio of CBICs with duration is correct.
25 Duration is also a good measure of 
interest rate sensitivity of the liabilities of pension annuity companies in Mexico as 
liability cash flows are not interest rate sensitive. 
However, while duration is a good measure of interest rate sensitivity it is not a perfect 
measure.  Its major limitation relates to the fact that it is a good approximation of price 
changes only: (1) when interest rate risk stems from only parallel shifts in the yield curve; 
and (2) when interest rate risk stems from only small changes in interest rate.  Due to 
these limitations, the CNSF may want to extend the metrics required by pension annuity 
companies to measure interest rate sensitivity. 
A first metric used to address the second limitation mentioned above is convexity.  
Convexity is a second-order term that measures the change in price from the duration 
estimate for a small change in rates.  For instance, for a positive duration instrument with 
no embedded options, positive convexity means that the duration extends (increases) 
when interest rates fall, and the duration shortens (decreases) when interest rates rise.
26 
Duration and convexity would take care of the asymmetric percentage change in prices of 
bonds when the yield curve shifts upwards or downwards.  In other words, the two 
metrics together can measure interest rate risk for large interest rate changes.  Typically, 
in an asset liability management (ALM) strategy it is required that the convexity of assets 
                                                 
24 A bond with an embedded option is generally a bond the expected cash flow of which changes when 
interest rates change.  Typically this happens in variable coupon bonds, in bonds that can be called by the 
issuers or in mortgage backed bonds where there is a prepayment risk that is a function of the level of 
interest rates. 
25 For bonds with embedded options like mortgage backed securities, variable coupon bonds or corporate 
callable bonds other interest rate sensitiveness measures need to be used.   
26 All fixed cash-flow bonds have positive duration and positive convexity.  Securities with embedded 
options may have regions with negative or reduced positive convexity.  For example, home mortgages can 
have negative convexity as rates lower and increase the likelihood of prepayments, resulting in lower 
duration as rates fall, and convexity may turn positive from lower likelihood of prepayment or extension 
resulting in greater duration as rates rise. 
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be larger than the convexity of liabilities.  If this is the case, when interest rates increase, 
the value of assets decreases by less than the value of liabilities while when interest rates 
decrease, the value of assets increases by more than the value of liabilities. 
A second metric commonly used to address the first limitation mentioned above are key 
rate or partial duration.  Hardly does the yield curve shifts in parallel.  More often the 
curve twists (it becomes flatter or steeper) or changes in curvature (butterfly shifts).  Key 
rate duration, or partial duration, measure the local sensitivity to a shift in just a portion 
of the yield curve.  Key rate duration or partial duration are useful metrics when one 
wishes to measure a portfolio's sensitivity portfolio to movement in various parts of the 
yield curve.
27 By matching partial durations of asset and liability portfolios it is possible 
to obtain a substantial degree of protection against nonparallel shifts in the yield curve.  
In addition, key rate shifts are constructed so that their sum equals a parallel shift and 
thus the sum of key rate durations is equal to effective duration for fixed cash flow 
instruments.
28
Finally, the requirement for companies to be fully duration matched aims at immunizing 
assets and liabilities, this may not be consistent with other company policies such as 
surplus management policies or yield enhancement policies.  For instance, companies 
may be interested in immunizing the surplus from changes in interest rate and therefore 
they would match assets and liabilities in terms of dollar duration, rather than simpler 
duration.   
Alternatively companies may want to adopt yield enhancing tactics by having shorter 
asset duration if they believe interest rates will be increasing.  The considerations just 
made are purely tactical and provide an argument for allowing companies to maximize 
their competitive advantage.  This does not mean that other measures should not be 
preferred from the supervisory point of view.  However, they constitute a valid argument 
for supervisory authorities for using a diverse set of risk metrics for prudential rules.   
 
II.E Market  Performance 
Company performance is determined by jointly underwriting and reserve investment 
performance.  In this section we discuss separately underwriting and investment 
performance and their impact on solvency of pension annuity companies. 
 
Underwriting performance 
Underwriting performance is usually measured by four basic ratios: the loss ratio 
(LR), the operational expense ratio (OR), the underwriting expense ratio (UR), and the 
combined ratio (CR).  The LR measures net accrued claims as a proportion of net earned 
premiums, i.e., gross claims paid less claim provisions at the beginning of the year plus 
                                                 
27 Key rate and partial durations are essentially the same concept.  The only difference is that key rate 
durations are calculated by shocking the spot rate curve while partial durations are calculated by shocking 
the yield curve. 
28 See Ho (1992), Reitano (1992), Fabozzi and Fong (1994), and Dettatreya and Fabozzi (1995) for various 
alternative metrics that follow the approach just described. 
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claim provisions at the end of the year less the receipt from reinsurers over gross 
premiums received less premiums ceded (net or retained premiums) less premium 
provisions at the end of the year plus premium provisions at the beginning of the year.  It 
shows the percentage of premiums that are paid back to the insured and a high ratio 
normally indicates an efficient and competitive industry while a low ratio would indicate 
relative inefficiency.  Notice that since payments for claims are spread in the pension 
annuity market over a number of years, insurance companies make transfers to loss 
reserves to cover future payments.  Differences in reserving policies for tax and other 
purposes reduce the usefulness of the loss ratio as an index of efficiency.  Hence, an 
index average over two or more years is often taken.  The OR is computed as general 
administrative expenses (wages and other labor costs, rental and other utilities), plus 
marketing and other support services like IT and legal services as a proportion of gross 
premium income.  The UR is computed as general underwriting expenses like net 
commissions paid (i.e., commissions paid to agents less commissions received from 
reinsurers) as a proportion of gross premiums and in the case of pension annuity 
providers in Mexico, premiums for the purchase of additional benefits need to be added.  
Gross premium is used as the basis for calculating the OR and the UR because 
acquisition costs and general administrative costs are incurred for the generation of gross 
premiums, and not just retained premiums.  The CR is simply the sum of the three ratios 
just mentioned.  Notice that it is common practice worldwide to sum indices with 
different denominators, despite this being mathematically incorrect, as the LR typically 
represents more than 90 percent of the CR.  In other words, the possible distortion 
introduced by this practice can be easily ignored. 
Figure 3 reports the evolution of the average underwriting performance between 1997 
and 2005 for the Mexican pension annuity market.  Underwriting performance displays a 
similar pattern of progressive deterioration we are now familiar with other variables.  
Average loss ratios in 1997 exceeded 140 percent due to the fact that many companies 
were trying to establish a reputation in the annuity market and gain market shares by 
offering very generous additional benefits.  After this initial year underwriting 
performance has always been positive but progressively deteriorating until 2002 when it 
exceeded 100.  The general trend in increasing underwriting and operational costs is due 
to the decrease in gross premium income since 2002 and the need to invest in a more 
qualified and professional sales force.  In an environment of decreasing investment 
performance (see later) companies could not afford to compete on the basis of generous 
additional benefits anymore.  In other words, substantial training and expanded sales 
forces were needed to attract new customers.  This is particular evident in 2003 when 
companies realized that the growth of new business was going to be lower than expected 
and needed to adapt to the less profitable environment by improving their distribution 
channels. 
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It is important to notice how the worsening underwriting performance of pension annuity 
companies in Mexico is not due to inefficiencies.  The real reason for the worsening 
underwriting performance since 2002 is the drastic fall in gross premium income (the 
reasons for which are discussed in detail in section III) and the delayed cost structure 
adjustments that companies have introduced.  The next table reports the evolution of 
gross premium income and underwriting costs divided in pure underwriting costs and 
costs related to premiums for additional benefits.  It essentially reports the UR data 
showed in the previous figure. 
 
Table 15: Evolution of Average Underwriting Costs, MXN Million, 2001–2005 
  2001 % 2002 %  20 %  4  % 2005     03  200     %
GPI 16,640.59    10,261.26  3,501.71     4,504.33    5,224.7   
Pure Underwriting    2.4  288 173.9   5. .5  3.1 203
Additional Benefits    7.1 695.98 33   9.5 14  3 177.6
Total Underwriting  1,152.48  9.5  984.68  9.6 506.18  14.5  318.64  6.1 380.93  8.5 
403.90 .70  2.8  6 0 162 .26  4.5 
1,178.58     6.8  2.21   156. .0  7  3.9 
Note  Real 2005 pesos 
Sour
 
The sudden increase in the underwriting expense ratio (the same could be said as far as 
operational expenses, not reported in the table, are concerned) in 2003 was due to the 
iums from 2002 onwards that was only partially offset by the 
nderwriting costs over the same period.  Gross premium income in 2003 was 
4 percent of gross premium income of 2002.  Pure underwriting costs (agent fees) in 
2003 were only 60 percent of the value of 2002 while premiums for additional benefits 
decreased in 2003 to 48 percent the values of 2002.  In other words, companies were 
s: 1/
ce: CNSF 
sudden drop in prem
decrease in u
3
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rather quick to adjust the generosity of additional benefits but not as quick in adjusting 
the commission levels paid to agents.  Such adjustments took place only between 2004
and 2005 that brought the overall underwriting expense ratio to 8.5 percent, a level
than in 2001. 
 
Investment performance 
The problem of combined ratios is that they are frequently negative (or equivalently
above 100 percent as shown in Figure 3).  In other words, they are not very informative 





As a way of example, the following table reports a summary analysis of 
profitability of non-life markets in select industrialized countries.  Notice how the 
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Table 16: Evolution of Average Non-Life Loss Ratios in Select Countries (in 
Percent) 
  USA CAN GBR DEU FRA 
  ‘94 – ‘04  ‘94 – ‘04  ‘94 – ‘04  ‘94 – ‘04  ‘95 – ‘04  ’96 – ‘04 
Loss  ratio  78.7 73.3 73.0 71.3 80.8 61.2 
Expense  ratio  /1  26.4 29.8 31.2 27.5 23.3 38.1 
Polic holder  dividend  ratio  1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.  1.1 0.1 
99.4 
formance  16.2 13.8 16.8 15.4 13.4  4.7 
Profit margin re tax) 
y 
Combined  ratio  106.2 103.1 104.2  99.9 105.2 
Investment  per
 (p 9.2  10.4  12.8  12.7  7.0  4.4 
Notes: 1/ this is comparable to und pe rat e r  M ion
industry. 
zeu Lechner (2006). 
ent of a company performance is given by the rate urn th
serves.  reviou entioned, pension annuity companies invest 
 pressure decreased considerably.  The next figure reports the evolution of 
k for Mexico.  This is measured by the JP Morgan EMBI+; i.e., 
e interest rate difference between Mexico and US Treasury Bills.  As of November 22 
005, this was at historical lows of 112 basis points. 
erwriting ex nse and ope ional expens atios for the exican pens  annuity 
Source: Hol
 
Hence, the final elem
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reserves in government debt.  With increased fiscal discipline, sovereign risk and 
inflation
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Figure 4: Evolution of Sovereign Risk and Inflation 
   
Source: CNSF 
 
The improved macroeconomic environment enabled the central bank to decrease interest 
rates and the next figure reports the evolution of companies’ financial results and 
reference interest rates such as the rate of Cetes
29 and CPP
30.  Given the exposure to 
interest rate sensitive instruments, the investment performance of annuity companies has 
deteriorates as shown in the next figure.  After reaching a record investment return 
performance of 20 percent nominal in 1998, average nominal rates over the 2002 and 
2005 period have decreased to 6.1 percent. 
Pension annuity companies have large positions of government bonds known as 
UDIBONOS (Bonos De Desarrollo Del Gobierno Federal Denominados En Unidades De 
Inversión), PICs (Pagarés de Indemnización Carretera con aval del Gobierno Federal) and 
CBICs (Certificados Bursátiles de Indemnización Carretera con aval del Gobierno 
Federal).  The long term real interest rate, in the case of 10 yr Udibonos have passed from 
7.14 percent in October 1999 to 4.30 in December 2005 and to 5.09 percent in June 2006; 
in the case of PICs the long term real interest rates have passed from around 6.13 percent 
in October 2001 to around 5.94 percent in November 2002 and in the case of 20 and 30 
yr CBICs the long term real interest rates decreased from 6.16 and 6.21 percent in 
January 2003 to 4.59 and 4.68 percent in December 2005, in that order.   
 
                                                 
29 CETES (Treasury Certificates) Zero coupon bills denominated in pesos issued by the Mexican 
government.  CETES are the Mexican counterparts of U.S.  Treasury bills.   
30 CPP (Commercial Bank's Average Cost of Term Deposits) covers term deposits, certificate of deposits, 
other current account deposits (other than demand deposits), banker's acceptances and commercial paper 
with bank guarantee.   
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Clearly, especially for new business, the decrease in yield on fixed income paper is 
lowering the profit margins of the pension annuity sector.  However, this has so far not 
translated in lowered solvency margins as discussed in the next section. 
 
Solvency 
Beside the technical provisions that companies must constitute in order to meet 
obligations arising form contracts with policyholders, solvency rules contained in the 
LGISMS require companies to establish a Minimum Guarantee Capital (Capital Mínimo 
de Garantía, CMG).  The CMG is used to face possible deviations as a result of 
variations from expected claims, the breakdown in payments due to insolvent reinsurers, 
and adverse fluctuations in asset valuation as well as mismatches between assets and 
liabilities.  In this respect the CMG requirements seek to strengthen the financial 
solvency and viability of institutions as a function of their volume of operations as well 
as the type or risks underwritten. 
CNSF (2006b) contains a detailed description of the solvency rules applying to all 
insurance companies in Mexico.  It is interesting to notice that, the methodology for the 
estimation of the CMG also incorporates a requirement to cover possible losses resulting 
from the exposure to credit, inflation and interest rate risk in the investment of technical 
provisions.  In order to do this, the CNSF establishes a system of asset liability matching 
that includes weights to measure the impact that eventual mismatches would have on 
capital.  The weighing system is a function of the availability of investment instruments 
of different maturities in the market and it depends among other things on the volume and 
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frequency of issues in the primary market, availability and liquidity on the secondary 
market. 
 
Table 17: Weighting System for Asset Liability Mismatches 
Year of Projection  Wk
k <= 5  1 
5 < k <= 6  0.96 
6 < k <= 7  0.94 
7 < k <= 8  0.85 
8 < k <= 9  0.78 
9 < k <= 12  0.51 
12 < k <= 14  0.46 
14 < k <= 15  0.42 
15 < k <= 17  0.37 
17 < k <= 18  0.30 
18 < k <= 19  0.25 
19 < k <= 20  0.24 
20 < k <= 21  0.23 
21 < k <= 23  0.20 
23 < k <= 24  0.19 
24 < k <= 25  0.17 
25 < k <= 27  0.13 
27 < k <= 28  0.08 
28 < k <= 29  0.02 
29 < k <= 30  0.01 
k > 30  0.00 
Source: CNSF 
 
Table 17 reports the weighting system provided by the CNSF to the industry to weigh 
eventual mismatches between assets and liabilities in the calculations of the CMG as of 
March 2006.  The weighting system is regularly updated by the CNSF and communicated 
to the industry when the situation in the financial market requires it.  Notice that the 
weighting system decreases with time reflecting the lack progressive unavailability of 
longer term instruments. 
Ideally, all weight should be equal to one and if this were the case, the CNSF estimates 
that companies would need to set aside an extra amount of capital equivalent to 
25 percent of current technical provisions (or MXN 18,410 million).  The methodology 
used to calculate additional capital requirements in the presence of asset liability 
mismatches appears to follow a “regulatory maturity gap approach” to asset liability 
management.  It is not clear how this complements or substitutes the economic duration 
approach that companies need to follow when measuring and monitoring risks.  For 
instance, no reference was found in regulations on the impact that such economic ALM 
framework based on duration metrics has on capital.  Besides, a maturity gap analysis 
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that by regulation puts zero, or tending to zero, weights on maturity mismatch on long 
term maturities may underestimate the interest rate risk stemming from yield curve 
movements in the same region; i.e., there may be a need to complement this with an 
economic maturity gap analysis that uses unit weights at all maturities.  In any case, 
maturity gap analysis (weighted, like in Mexico, or not weighted, as generally used) is a 
marked improvement on any ALM framework observed in all jurisdictions in the region, 
and clearly a vast improvement on ad hoc fixed paid up capital rules.  However, it is no 
substitute of a full fledged ALM framework for ongoing monitoring and controlling the 
various types of risks that stem from the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. 
As a result of the underwriting and investment performance of pension annuity 
companies over the last nine years, as well as the specific structure of assets and 
liabilities that obviously affect the solvency margin, the regulatory solvency position of 
pension annuity providers (measured in terms of MXN in excess of the required CMG) 
and other performance indicators like ROE and ROA have improved over time as 
reported in the next table. 
 
Table 18: Pension Annuities Solvency and Profitability Indicators (1997–2005) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005 
Solvency  Margin  (MXN  million) 667.2 292.5 811.3 862.0 570.8 829.1 2,176.8 1,761.2 2,927.5 
ROE  (percent)  -8 -29.2 -20.2 -19.8  -6.4  15.6  22.5  26.1  24.3 
ROA  (percent)  -2.9  -3 -1.2 -0.9 -0.3  0.7  2.9  4.0  1.9 
Source: CNSF 
 
There is a seeming contradiction between, on the one hand, the sudden decrease in 
premiums since 2002, the worsening of the underwriting profitability and the decrease in 
investment yield and, on the other hand, the improvement over time in the solvency 
margin.  One possible explanation for this is that the size of assets corresponding to the 
more important portfolio of business (in relative terms) is still growing quickly enough to 
compensate for the other negative trends mentioned before related especially to the 
reduced new business.  Another possible explanation is that companies are still obtaining 
high levels of ROE and ROA for assets invested at higher yields in the past.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the worsening of the underwriting performance, together 
with lower long term yield on fixed income paper has indeed translated in lower 
economic solvency margins for the industry in the medium term.  However, this is not 
disclosed by the regulatory solvency margin due to its low weights on long term 
mismatches between assets and liabilities.  The adoption of other forms of solvency 
margins based on economic capital, at least for prudential purposes, would enable the 
CNSF to better monitor the economic solvency of the industry and take eventual 
appropriate remedial actions.
31
                                                 
31 Notice, that the CNSF has completed and implemented a dynamic solvency model, an important step 
toward the adoption of statutory solvency rules envisioned within the Solvency II framework.  The model 
uses historical data to construct claim distributions for different lines of business.  It allows the CNSF to 
calculate the probability of capital shortages of each insurance company by stressing variables that affect its 
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III DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR THE PENSION ANNUITY 
MARKET 
In the previous section two distinct periods were identified in the evolution of key 
variables and performance of the pension annuity market in Mexico.  Between 1997 and 
2002 the annuity market witnessed rapid growth while starting with 2002, the volume of 
gross premium income drastically dropped.  In this section we shed light on the reasons 
for such change in market growth. 
Disability pension benefits provided for under the LSS-73 were based on the nominal 
average base salary of the last 500 weeks of contributions.  Art 167 of the LSS-73 
defined the methodology for calculating such benefits linking them to the individual’s 
years of contributions according to a table published in the same article.  Benefits were 
originally indexed to the minimum salary in the Federal District.  In addition to the 
disability pension, insured members were eligible for pension increments on the basis of 
family allowances and other forms of social assistance. 
With the 1997 reform, the new IV benefit is defined as 35 percent of the average 
individual base salary during the last 500 weeks of contribution and indexed to the INPC.  
Minimum IV pension under the new rules is defined as the minimum salary in the 
Federal District as of July 1
st, 1997 which is itself indexed to the INPC.  Similarly to the 
provisions of LSS-73, insured members are eligible for IV pension increments on the 
basis of family allowances and other social assistance.  The IV benefits provided for 
under LSS-97 were designed to be on average more generous than the disability benefit 
provided for under LSS-73.  Also, with the reform, IV immediate premium annuities 
were going to be purchased by the IMSS, with the accumulated reserve stemming from a 
2.5 percent contribution rate, from private sector specialized pension annuity providers.   
The structure of the new pension system allowed to promote the development of a private 
sector annuity market before new entrants into the labor force started retiring and 
demanding old age pensions.
32
Such rationale was also followed by Chile that experienced a rapid growth of the annuity 
market and currently has a very competitive annuity market providing very good annuity 
values to retirees (see section II.B).  Countries that have introduced a second, private 
                                                                                                                                                 
underwriting and overall profit.  The output of this exercise guides conversations with the industry to 
monitor the solvency situation and the adequacy capital requirements and technical reserves.  Two issues 
related to this dynamic model are worth mentioning here.  The model is not yet a true dynamic ALM where 
assets and liabilities are modeled jointly.  At present asset risk is modeled only through the use of VaR 
techniques and separately from liabilities.  Also, the model does not exploit possible correlation among the 
liability distributions of different lines of business and each claim distribution is treated as independent 
from the others.  As far as the first issue is concerned, the CNSF is working towards a more general model 
that integrates assets and liabilities.  As far as the second issue is concerned, the CNSF argues that little 
correlation exists in practice among claim distributions of different lines of business.  While such property 
of the model would be desirable, it would provide only marginal value added.  (See CNSF 2006e) 
32 It is worth re-calling at this point that the so called “transitional cohort,” i.e., individuals with at least one 
contribution at the time of the 1997 reform, is allowed to opt for the old age pension provided for under 
LSS-73. 
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pillar as part of their pension reform, and that have shifted disability and survivorship 
insurance to the new pillar, either partly or totally, may also experience this rapid growth 
effect.  Some reforming countries in Central and Eastern Europe have decided to 
maintain disability insurance in the first, public pillar, because of concerns about the 
capacity of the insurance industry to deliver this benefit efficiently, and because of the 
perception that disability and other programs such as health and sick pay can only be well 
integrated in the public sector.  These concerns may be legitimate and may justify 
keeping disability in the first pillar in several countries.  However, this policy will also 
imply a slower growth of the annuities market. 
Since 1997, several reforms were implemented that altered the philosophy underpinning 
the provision of IV benefits after the 1997 reform.  In 2001, the indexation base of 
pension benefits provided for under LSS-73 was changed from the minimum salary in the 
Federal District to the INPC.  Since, average wage growth after the 1997 reform has been 
lower than inflation this reform increased the generosity of the 1973 benefits relatively to 
the 1997 benefits.
33 In 2002, a second reform of the LSS-97 was passed allowing 
individuals who retired under the provision of LSS-73 to withdraw as a lump sum the 
balance of the 2 percent accumulate contributions for old age pension in the RCV 
subaccount.
34 The permission to withdraw the accumulated balance from the old age 
contribution in the RCV accounts increased the generosity of the pension provisions 
under LSS-73 relatively to the now reformed provisions under LSS-97.  In addition, the 
IMSS was given the authority to interpret the provisions under the LSS-97 and it 
extended the option of electing benefits under LSS-73 also to IV benefits. 
After the 2002 reform, known as the SAR-02 reform, insured members could then choose 
between two types of disability benefits as summarized in the following table. 
 
                                                 
33 Wage inflation is traditionally higher than price inflation over long period of times.  Clearly, the 
statement is valid only with respect to the specific period of time mentioned. 
34 This refers to the accumulated balance of the 2 percent contribution after 1997 in the RCV sub-account 
(see first line, third column in Table 1).  Notice that the SAR-97 reform had already allowed individuals 
opting for benefits provided for under LSS-73 to withdraw as a lump sum the accumulated balance between 
1992 and 1997 in the SAR-92 account (see first line, second column in Table 1). 
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Table 19: Disability Benefits Under LSS-73 and LSS-97 
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The increased relative generosity o 73 provisions and the fact that the IMSS 
ing IV benefits under such provisions and opted for tightened 
eligibility and disability rules, changed the growth prospects of the market and premium 
rowth decreased in the years since 2002 relative to previous years as shown in the next 
 
ce: Fernandez Reyes (2004) 
f the 19
granted the option of elect
g
figure.   
The only thing left to be explained now is why insured individuals would stop electing 
disability benefits under the LSS-97 provisions when, on average, these were designed to
be more generous than the disability benefits provided under LSS-73, as mentioned 
before.  The following table compares the disability pension that an insured individual 
would obtain under the provisions of LSS-73 and LSS-97.  In order to compare the 
heterogeneous benefits under the two laws, the old age balance payable in the form of a 
lump sum from the RCV subaccount when individual elect the LSS-73 was transformed 
in IV annuity and added to the basic pension the individual would be entitled. 
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Table 20: Monthly Disability Benefit Comparison Under 1973 and 1997 Laws 
(MXN) 
  1973 Law 
Years of contributions  1997 Law 
Average salary  5  10  15  20  25   
1,500  1,409  1,418  1,431  1,449  1,476 1,551 
3,000  1,415  1,433  1,459 1,750 2,066 1,551 
4,500  1,422  1,449 1,709 2,236 2,786 1,575 
6,000  1,428  1,464  1,902 2,666 3,462 2,100 
7,500  1,434  1,480  2,157 3,149 4,180 2,625 
9,000  1,441  1,495  2,443 3,656 4,917 3,150 
10,500  1,447  1,511  2,850 4,266 5,736 3,675 
12,000  1,611  1,684  3,257 4,875 6,556 4,200 
13,500  1,802  1,894  3,665 5,485 7,375 4,725 
Source: Fernandez Reyes (2004)  
 
The comparison exercise reported in the previous table suggests that on average, the large 
majority of individuals (the shaded area) would prefer the benefits under the LSS-97.  
Only individuals with more than 15 years of contributions and more than twice the 
minimum salary (the average salary in Mexico is between four and five times the 
minimum salary) would prefer benefits under the LSS-73 the relative generosity of which 
was increased by the 2001 and 2002 reforms. 
Several reasons can be attributed to the seeming irrational behavior of insured individuals 
that caused the annualized average decrease of 28 percent in premium since 2001 
displayed in Figure 6. 
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The IMSS may not be informing the insured individuals about the available options of IV 
benefits.  A casual interpretation of Article IV of the transition provisions of LSS-97 (and 
IMSS’ position) would indicate that the IMSS is not required to compare benefits under 
the two laws unless insured people require the institute to do so.  Unfortunately, the LSS-
97 is badly written in several articles and this case is not an exception.  Clearly, only 
jurisprudence can establish the correct interpretation of the specific article before 
mentioned. 
In addition, the IMSS is recently making increased use of temporary disability pensions.  
Eligibility rules for disability benefits were tightened in 2004 and the IMSS is supporting 
a policy of rehabilitation before declaring individuals disabled.  Temporary disability 
pensions are provided by the IMSS for two years and renewable indefinitely.  This has 
had two major consequences: (1) the number of potential annuitants in the private sector 
is further reduced; and (2) the pool of annuitants that is covered by pension annuity 
providers is deteriorating.   
The decrease in the long term interest rate and the lower number of new annuitants are 
lowering the profit margins of the annuity companies as typically, during the early years 
of marketing of a new product, companies tend to underprice and seek market share.
35 
The lower profitability of the initial products is recuperated through the yield on income 
paper and the business growth.  We have produced in this paper evidence of average 
deterioration of underwriting performance.  Hence, IMSS’ behavior has reduced the 
opportunity of higher profits for insurance companies by reducing the scope for business 
growth. 
The deterioration of the pool of annuitants also impacts profitability.  Insurance 
companies make money by pooling different types together and charging a price that on 
average is neither too high nor too low: i.e., a price that on average generates reasonable 
profits.  Within the pool, stochastic variations across types are averaged out and the 
money lost by insuring an individual who ex post lives (say) longer than what ex ante 
expected is recuperated by insuring an individual who ex post lives less than what ex ante 
expected.  To the extent that the ex post variation in outcomes is only due to stochastic 
elements, the pool is said to be stable and insurance companies can profitably insure 
individuals.  IMSS’ behavior has introduced a systemic element in the pool of annuitants.  
The use of temporary pensions delays entry of disabled individual in the pool.  Since 
seriously disabled individuals tend to die early, the delayed entry in the pool implies that, 
on average, individuals insured by private sector companies tend to live longer than 
expected.  In other words, even if we assume that the initial technical parameters that the 
regulations require companies to use were correct, they are likely to result in a non 
profitable, or less profitable product once delayed entry is taken into consideration. 
But why would the IMSS encourage individuals to elect benefits under the LSS-73 law 
even if this is against their interest? In order to explain this, it is necessary to analyze the 
possible states of the world for an individual in the transition cohort (i.e., who has the 
option to elect IV benefits under the two laws) who is declared disabled by the IMSS and 
                                                 
35 In the Mexican case “underpricing” appears to have taken place through the offer of generous additional 
products.  This is due to the fact that IV and RT benefits are defined by the LSS-97. 
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determine the payoffs for the federal government, the IMSS and the insured individual in 
all these states.  This is done with the aid of the next table. 
The simplest case is when the individual elects benefits under LSS-73.  This is described 
in the last column of the next table (Case E).  Independently of whether the base pension 
(PB) calculated with the use of Art 167 of LSS-73 is higher than the minimum pension 
guarantee (PMG) the individual withdraws the cash balance in the SAR-92 account and 
the old age cash balance in the RCV subaccount.  The rest of the cash balances in the 
housing and RCV subaccounts are collected by the federal government that will grant the 
annuity or the minimum pension (if the base pension is lower than the minimum pension 
guarantee).  In both cases, the IMSS is not required to transfer to the federal government 
the portion of the reserve accumulated by the 2.5 percent contribution of the insured 
individual declared disabled. 
 
Table 21: Choice of IV Benefits Under LSS-73 and LSS-97 For The Transitional 
Cohort 
 LSS-97  LSS-73 
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: CB = C c pensi on G
uity pre
If the insured individual elects benefit ore 
complicat distingu ion calculated as 35 
e RCV and housing subaccounts are collected by the IMSS 
at purchases the annuity in the private sector by paying an immediate premium.  If the 
immediate premium is lower than the available cash balance, the IMSS retains the 
IV 
ash Balance, PB = IV basi
mium.   
on, PMG = Minimum Pensi uarantee, MC = Immediate 
s under the LSS-97, then things are a little m
ishing.  If the basic pens ed.  Four cases need 
percent of the average base salary in the last five years is higher than the minimum 
pension guarantee the individual withdraws the cash balance in the SAR-92 account, the 
other cash balances (CB) in th
th
difference in the IV reserve (Case A).  If the immediate premium is higher than the 
available cash balances (Case B) the IMSS complements the cash balances with the 
reserve accumulated through the 2.5 percent IV contributions of the working IMSS 
membership.   
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If the basic pension calculated as 35 percent of the average base salary in the last five 
working years of the insured individual is higher than the minimum pension guarantee 
the individual withdraws the cash balance in the SAR-92 account, the other cash ba
(CB) in the RCV and housing subaccounts are collected by the IMSS that purchases
minimum pension guarantee in the private sector by paying an immediate premium.  If 









ation of around 1.7 percent of GDP at the end of 2005; and (2) the 
specific design of the 1997 reform, that created the pension annuity market, was such that 








surance companies could hedge the unexpected 
d 
es the 
interaction of life insurance and annuities to a change in mortality to stabilize aggregate 
is higher than the available cash balances (Case D) the federal government is required 
complement the cash balances to enable IMSS to buy the PMG. 
The asymmetric impact of the provisions under LSS-73 and LSS-97 on the IV reserve in 
IMSS is obvious.  If individuals elect benefits under LSS-73, the IMSS can charge the 
federal government and the IV reserve remains untouched.  If individuals elect benefits 
under the LSS-97, the IMSS has to use the IV reserve to complement the cash balances 
from the housing and RCV subaccounts.  Apparently, the federal government has stopped
complementing the cash balances for the purchase of the minimum pension guarantee 
(Case D above). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The pension annuity market in Mexico is small.  As of end of 2005, market 
penetration was only 0.05 percent of GDP while density was around MXN 43 per capita.  
Two reasons account for the small size of the market: (1) the overall insurance market 
small with penetr
pite its small size the pension annuity market in Mexico, as well as its regulat
framework, display interesting characteristics that provide lessons for other countries that 
still need to design the decumulation phase of their newly established second pillars, as 
well as raising some technical and policy concerns that could hamper in the future th
healthy development of the market.  These issues are: (1) industrial organization; (2) 
pricing and competition; (3) the 2002 SAR reform; and (4) the ALM framework for 
insuranc
remainder of this concluding section. 
A first issue relates to the industrial organization of the market.  In Mexico, only 
specialized pension annuity companies are allowed to operate in the market.  The 
rationale for this policy choice is related to the mandatory nature of the second pillar an
the implicit liability of the government associated with it.   
However, from the point of view of reducing the financial risk associated with longev
guarantees it would be preferable that general life insurance companies be allowed t
offer pension annuities.  General life in
systemic longevity improvements in the annuity portfolio with the resulting unexpecte
systemic mortality improvement in the pure death portfolio.  Natural hedging utiliz
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cash outflows.  Empirical evidence (Cox and Lin 2005) suggests that natural hedging is 











kly degenerating (see next paragraph).  Also, the long term 
in 
more significant for those insurers selling relatively more annuity business.  However, 
most insurance companies would still have considerable net exposure to mortality risks 
even if they reduced their exposure by pooling individual mortality risk and by balancin
their annuity positions against their life positions (Dowd et al.  2004 and Blake et al.  
2006).  This would imply that longevity risk needs diversifying with the use of longevity 
linked instruments possibly issued by the government or international organizations. 
A second issue relates to pricing and competition.  Prudential mortality and technical 
parameters for pricing are fixed by regulation so that any given annuity provider can only
offer one price to any given pensioner.  In order to promote competition for annuity 
products, pension annuity providers are allowed to offer additional benefits such as 
additional annuity benefits or life insurance products by purchasing them from other 
insurance companies.  The rationale for this policy decision is again related to the lega
constrains the mandatory nature of the pension second pillar and the objective of not 
exposing prospective annuitants to unfair pricing by pension providers.   
The competition on additional benefits makes it difficult to compare offers from different
companies.  It would be preferable that from the point of view of transparency, providers 
competed only on the basis of the pension benefit.  While this would increase 
transparency it would create additional issues that need to be addressed.  The experienc
in Chile, where prices are not regulated, suggests that the annuitants can obtain very h
money’s worth ratios on their annuities despite some price variation across ages and 
premium levels.  Price deregulation should be accompanied by strong measure to 
maintain transparency in the quotation system for annuities and to curb ev
inappropriate market conduct by brokers.  Again, the Chilean experience reported in the 
text can serve as guidance. 
Another argument against price regulation of annuities relates to solvency of p
annuity providers and the quality of services they can afford to customers; i.e., to 
customer protection.  For instance, the mortality tables used are experimental tables based 
on population averages and annuity companies would need to develop their own 
annuitant mortality tables when sufficient mortality experience is accumulated.  Th
especially urgent since pension policy changes introduced in 2002 have altered th
demographic assumptions at the basis of the pricing framework adopted in 1998 so that 
the IV annuitant pool is quic
real interest rate has moved from around 7.14 percent in October 1999 to 4.30 percent 
December 2005 and 5.09 percent in June 2006 in the case of 10 yr Udibonos; from 
around 6.13 in October 2001 to 5.94 in November 2002 in the case of PICs and from 6.16 
and 6.21 percent in January 2003 to 4.59 and 4.68 percent in December 2005 in the case 
of 20 and 30 yr CBICs; while the technical rate used for pricing of 3.5 percent real has 
not been modified.  Indeed, pension providers can add a 3 percent mark up for 
administrative costs and deviation in the mortality assumptions that has no effect on the 
annuity value because by law the pension is established considering defined benefits.  
Technical rate used for pricing should be liberalized (which would imply changes in the 
current legal constrains) or regularly analyzed to maintain it below expected long run 
interest rates. 
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A third issue relates to the option extended to IV and RT annuitants to elect benefits
under the LSS-73.  A series of reforms in 2001 and 2002 have progressively reduced th
generosity of IV benefits under the LSS-97 provisions relative to the LSS-73 pr
For instance, the indexation base of pension benefits provided for under the LSS-73 was 
changed in 2001 from the minimum salary in the Federal District to the INPC.  With th
Mexican experience of very low wage inflation this resulted in a relatively lower 













 benefits under the LSS-73 and LSS-97 
nt 
 






inflation is on average higher than price inflation over long period of times.  In addition 
price inflation is a more transparent index to follow that minimum wage inflation.  
Finally, minimum wages tend to be changed in many countries in an ad hoc fashion, 
following political motivations, which would have resulted in highly unpredictable 
benefit expenditure for the federal government.  In 2002, a second reform of the LSS-97 
was passed allowing individuals who elect benefits under the provision of LSS-73 to 
withdraw as a lump sum the balance of the 2 percent accumulate contributions for old ag
pension in the RCV subaccount.  Such withdrawal is not allowed for people electing 
benefits under the LSS-97 provisions. 
In 2002 the IMSS granted IV and RT insured individuals to elect benefits under the
73 provisions.  This resulted in a sudden drop of gross premium income to the private
sector pension annuity providers.  In addition the IMSS tightened eligibility criteria 
2002 and started making a larger use of temporary IV pensions so that the individual who
eventually end up purchasing IV or RT annuities from the private sector tend to live 
longer than anticipated. 
There is a concern that insured individuals are not receiving adequate guidance for the 
IMSS at the moment of choice between
provisions.  In fact, even with the 2001 and 2002 reforms, IV pension benefits under the 
LSS-97 provisions are on average designed to be more generous.  Hence, the governme
should give priority to enhance transparency in choosing benefits under the old and new
system by putting in place a comprehensive election system for disabled workers.  The 
IMSS has an incentive to allow individuals to elect benefits under the old system 
because, when that happ
the contrary, insured individuals choose the new system, the IMSS has to use its own 
reserves to top up the disabled worker’s pension fund balance in order to buy him/her an
annuity in the market.  It appears, therefore, that the financial position of the IMSS 
improves if disabled workers choose benefits under the old system.  The IMSS, 
moreover, is not required by law to compare disability benefits under the two systems 
and disclose this comparison to the worker, unless the worker requests it.  As a result of 
all this, the federal government is now funding a liability that was not foreseen under the
1997 pension reform.  In order to improve the current situation, the government’s liabilit
should be clarified so as to ensure that IMSS is indifferent to whether disabled workers 
choose benefits under the old or new systems.  The necessary actions should be taken in 
order to enhance transparency in choosing benefits under the new and old system, so that 
IMSS appropriately compares and discloses disability benefits under the two system
Since benefits under the two provisions are heterogeneous, this may require deregulatin
annuity prices for private sector providers so that competition takes place only on the 
basis of basic benefits. 
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A final fourth issue relates to the ALM framework and its relationship to solvency.  
Mexico has introduced capital requirements based, among other things, on a regulatory 
maturity gap weighting system between assets and liabilities.  In addition companies are
required to define their ALM frameworks on the basis of duration metrics to manage 
interest rate risk.  Finally, inflation risk needs totally hedging.  The ALM framework used 
in Mexico and its relationship to capital requirements and therefore, solvency embrace 
internationally recognized good practices of risk management, placing the CNSF on the 
frontier within the region as far as risk management is concerned.  Nevertheless, three 
observations could be m
 




l requirements and 











hort term inflation risk for annuity companies 
and consider relaxing the inflation matching requirement for short term liabilities (below 
The first observation relates to the fact that the regulatory maturity gap system based on 
the availability of the investment instruments compared with the total technical provision
has very low weights on long term maturity gaps.  The CNSF estimates that on average in
a prudential scenario, with a reinvestment rate of 0 percent in real terms, a 25 percent 
increase in current levels of technical provisions would be required if weights were equal 
to unity at all maturities.  This suggests that pension annuity providers would be incurrin
potential interest rate risk that regulations do not adequately disclose. 
The second observation relates to the fact that the economic ALM framework that 
company needs developing does not seem to be related to capita
solvency.  An independent assessment of ALM practices would be required to provide 
technical assistance to the industry on how to improve the measuring, monitoring and 
management of interest rate risk.  In this paper we suggest that the use of partial or key 
durations and convexities (complemented by the current maturity gap analysis) could 
represent an important improvement on current practices. 
The third observation relates to the fact that longevity risk is completely born by annuity 
providers.  We already suggested that life insurance companies would 
hedge for such risk in their pure death (or death related) portfolios.  Longevity risk 
also be shared with annuitants through longevity participating annuities where annui
are “re-priced” on a regular basis (every three or five years) depending on the mortality
experience of the annuitant pool of each company.  The CREF annuity provided by the
US pension fund TIAA-CREF is a classic example, often quoted, of such risk sharing 
arrangement.  Longevity risk can also be shared with the federal government or other 
international institutions by requiring providers to purchasi
instruments such as longevity bonds.  There is a quickly growing literature on longevity-
linked instruments and the paper by Blake et al.  (2006) in the reference section provides 
a useful starting point for further study.   
Some less urgent issues relating to the investment rules for annuity companies could also
be addressed in order to better enable these companies to hedge inflation, interest rate, 
and longevity risks.  Despite companies can currently strip bonds to increase duration of
assets they appear not to be able to easily find a counterpart to do so.  The federal 
government may need to consider facilitating such matching by issuing zero coupon C
indexed bonds as well as longevity bonds.  In addition, authorities could conside
allowing annuity companies, subject to appropriate regulatory framework, to buy interest
rate swaps in the OTC market to better bridge duration mismatches.  Finally, the CNSF 
could assess the current and prospective s
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one year) as inflation indexed instruments with such short maturities are reported to be 
very illiquid. 
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APPENDIX A : REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PENSION 
ANNUITIES 
 
The following appendix lists the pieces of legislation and secondary regulations related to 
the market of pension annuities.
36
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36 This Appendix was kindly prepared by the CNSF and reported here as a mere reference.  All documents 
here listed can be accessed at www.cnsf.gob.mx. 
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age 
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APPENDIX B : LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AFORE Administradora  de  Fondos para el Retiro 
CBIC  Certificados Bursátiles de Indemnización Carretera 
CNSF  Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas 
CONAC  Colegio Nacional de Actuarios de México 
CONAPO  Consejo Nacional de Población 
CONSAR  Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro 
CR  Combined Ratio = LR + OR + UR 
IBNR  Incurred But Not Reported Claims Reserve 
IMSS  Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 
INFONAVIT  Instituto Del Fondo Nacional De La Vivienda Para Los Trabajadores 
IOSCO International  Organization of Securities Commissions 
ISSSTE  Instituto De Seguridad Y Servicios Sociales De Los Trabajadores Del 
Estado 
IV Invalidez  y  Vida 
LGISMS  Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros 
LR Loss  Ratio 
LSAR  Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro 
LSS-73  Ley de Seguro Social de 1973 
LSS-97  Ley de Seguro Social de 1997 
NPR  Net Premium Reserve (or mathematical reserve) 
OR  Operacional Expense Ratio 
PMG  Pensión Mínima Garantizada 
RBS  Requerimiento Bruto de Solvencia 
RCV  Retiro, Cesantía en Edad Avanzada y Vejez 
RIRT  Reglas para la Inversión de las Reservas Técnicas 
RMA  Rendimiento Mínimo Acreditable 
RT  Riesgo de Trabajo 
SAR  Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro 
SAR-02  Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (reforma de 2002) 
SAR-92  Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (reforma de 1992) 
SAR-97  Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (reforma de 1997) 
SHCP  Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico 
SIC  Sistema Internacional de Cotizaciones 
SIEFORE Sociedad  Especializada de Fondos para el Retiro 
SINCAS  Sociedades de Inversión de Capitales 
UDIBONOS  Bonos De Desarrollo Del Gobierno Federal Denominados En Unidades 
De Inversión 
UPR Unearned  Premium  Reserve 
UR  Underwriting Expense Ratio 
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